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Abstract 
Can a merger from duopoly to monopoly be detrimental for profits? This paper deals with 
this issue by focusing on the interaction between decreasing returns to labour (which 
imply firms’ convex costs) and centralised unionisation. Firstly, it is highlighted that a 
wage “non-rigidity” result applies: the post-merger wage is higher than in the pre-merger 
equilibrium. Secondly, it is shown that a “reversal result” in relation to merger 
profitability actually realises when the union is sufficiently oriented towards wages. 
Moreover, the higher the reservation wage, the degree of product differentiation and the 
union’s relative bargaining power, the higher the probability that merger reduces profits. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In recent decades the question whether a merger that is wholly anti-competitive is profitable has 
been increasingly addressed. In their seminal paper, Salant et al. (1983) developed a model with 
homogeneous goods, Cournot competition and constant as well as exogenously given marginal costs, 
showing that mergers that almost lead to a full-blown monopoly would be profitable.1 In this paper, 
we examine whether the result that a merger leading to a monopoly is always profitable still applies 
in a duopoly model, in which production costs are endogenous and the factor input displays 
diminishing returns. In particular, following the established literature on unionised oligopolies (e.g. 
Horn and Wolinsky 1988; Dowrick 1989; Naylor 1999; Correa-López and Naylor 2004; Brekke 
2004; Lommerud et al. 2005; Correa-López 2007; Symeonidis 2010), we consider a duopoly where 
wages are no longer exogenously given but are the outcome of a strategic game played between 
firms and a centralised (industry-wide) labour union. Indeed, centralised wage setting assumes 
particular relevance in concentrated industries (such as duopolies) because their characteristics 
increase the likelihood of union success in organizing at the industry level as well as maintaining its 
monopolistic position over time (see, e.g., Wallerstein 1999 in addition to the seminal papers by 
Segal 1964 and Weiss 1966).2 
Starting from Horn and Wolinsky (1988), extensions of the question raised by Salant et al. 
(1983) to unionised or vertically related industries have attracted considerable attention. 
Specifically, Horn and Wolinsky (1988, Section 5) pointed out that when products are substitutes 
                                                
1 Literally, “[m]erger to monopoly is always profitable. When all the firms in an n-firm equilibrium collude, 
so that there are no outsiders, profits must increase, since joint profits will then be maximized” (Salant et al. 
1983, p. 193). At the same time, they also demonstrated that only when a very large share of the market 
merges can the participants earn profits as a result of the merger, giving rise to the literature on the so-
called “merger paradox” (see, e.g., Deneckere and Davidson 1985; Perry and Porter 1985; Farrell and 
Shapiro 1990a, 1990b; McAfee and Williams 1992; Heywood and McGinty 2007). As will be clarified 
below, by considering the case of a merger between duopolists this paper does not deal with the merger 
paradox. 
2 This is also consistent with the dominant (albeit not unanimous) view that wages tend to be higher in more 
concentrated industries (e.g. Blanchflower 1986; Dickens and Katz 1987; Belman 1988). For instance, 
Belman (1988) showed that wage elasticity with respect to market concentration (concentration effect) is 
positive and much of the concentration effect is indirect, that is, it is mediated through unionisation. 
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and a common upstream input supplier bargains separately with downstream firms over a price of a 
homogeneous input, the profit of a downstream monopoly is less than the total downstream 
industry’s profit when it is a duopoly. This is because the input price under a downstream monopoly 
is higher than under a downstream duopoly, and this more than offsets the gains from monopolising 
the downstream industry. 
While Horn and Wolinsky’s (1988) result can be extended to a coordinated wage setting 
regime where an industry union coordinates the wage demands for all firms at the firm-level, we 
consider here a different context. We refer to a centralised wage setting, in which an industry-wide 
union sets a uniform wage for the entire industry. When wage negotiations are centralised at the 
industry level, Dhillon and Petrakis (2002) showed that a well-known “wage rigidity result” applies: 
under fairly general conditions, the competitive regime facing downstream firms has no effect on 
the wage. In turn, since wages are the same under a downstream duopoly and downstream 
monopoly, this should imply that a merger between downstream firms is always profitable. 
Accordingly, Brekke (2004) and Lommerud et al. (2005) investigate downstream mergers with 
upstream monopoly unions 3  and, although they contemplate the central union case, mainly 
concentrate on plant-specific and firm-specific unions (for which Dhillon and Petrakis’s (2002) 
“wage rigidity result” does not apply). Brekke (2004) refers specifically to the hospital industry, 
showing that “if hospitals compete in prices and quality, and the wage is set by a central union, a 
merger will not influence the wage and the results [among which, that hospital mergers are always 
profitable] are still valid” (Brekke 2004, Proposition 1). Instead, Lommerud et al. (2005) develop a 
unionised oligopoly model including a non-merging firm (an oligopoly with three rather than two 
firms) and focus on the merger between a domestic firm and either another domestic firm or a 
foreign firm, concluding that the equilibrium market structure is very likely a cross-border merger.4 
Similarly to Brekke (2004), they also point out that in the presence of a central union (industry-
                                                
3 Monopoly central union is a limiting case (with union having all the bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
employer federation, representing all firms in the industry; e.g. Dowrick 1989) of a scenario where wage 
negotiations are centralised at the industry level. Hence, the “wage rigidity result” should generally apply to 
this case. 
4 Notice that the case with a merger between two firms out of three is in some sense “weaker” than a merger 
from duopoly to monopoly on which we concentrate. Hence, we are confident that if a “reversal result” on 
merger profitability applies to our case, it should apply also to the former. 
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specific input supplier) “a merger would not affect input prices at all” (Lommerud et al. 2005, p. 
732).5 
To challenge the conventional result that under a centralised wage setting the competitive 
regime facing downstream firms has no effect on the wage and a downstream merger from duopoly 
to monopoly is always profitable, we depart from the above-mentioned literature by assuming that 
firms’ production technology exhibits decreasing returns to labour, which implies that firms have 
convex (increasing marginal) costs. Indeed, despite the tremendous growth experienced over the 
last few decades by this strand of IO literature, the effects produced by introducing labour 
decreasing returns in an unionised oligopoly framework have so far not been investigated.6 
Perry and Porter (1985) and Heywood and McGinty (2007) consider the role of increasing 
marginal costs for merger issues in oligopolistic markets. However, in their models (convex) costs 
are exogenously given and the effects of unionisation are not taken into account. Moreover, they 
focus on the so-called “merger paradox”, hence neglecting the case of a merger from duopoly to 
monopoly.7 Remarkably, while they introduce the role of convex costs to solve the paradox (that is, 
to restore merger profitability even when it does not lead to a full-blown monopoly), we point out 
that in our framework convex costs (labour decreasing returns) play instead the “opposite” role: 
together with unionised labour markets, they are used to establish the result that a merger from 
duopoly to monopoly can actually be detrimental for profits. 
Our main outcomes can be summarised as follows. First, in a basic framework with 
monopoly (central) union, homogeneous product and Cournot competition, we show that a wage 
“non-rigidity” result applies: the post-merger wage fixed by the union is higher than in the pre-
                                                
5 In the same vein, Symeonidis (2010) argues that the case with an industry-wide upstream agent (union) is 
“straightforward [since] when firms participate in centralised bargaining before competing in the 
downstream market […] the input price is the same whether the downstream firms merge or not” 
(Symeonidis 2010, p. 234). 
6 Exceptions are Fanti and Meccheri (2011, 2012) in which decreasing returns to labour have been 
introduced in a unionised duopoly model (with decentralised unions and a central union, respectively) to 
compare profits under Cournot and Bertrand competition. 
7 Consider a market with n independent firms. Following Salant et al.’s (1983) seminal work, “the merger 
paradox” implies that if m firms merge, then merging is not profitable for firms that participate whenever m 
< 0.8n. Clearly, the merger paradox does not refer to the case analysed in this paper, where m = n (= 2). 
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merger/Cournot equilibrium.8 Secondly, we point out that the decision by firms whether or not to 
merge is affected by the central union’s orientation towards wages with respect to employment. In 
particular, a “reversal result” on merger profitability (i.e. moving from duopoly to monopoly is 
detrimental for profits) actually holds true when the union’s preference towards wages is 
sufficiently high. Moreover, the higher the workers’ reservation wage, the higher ceteris paribus the 
probability that profits decrease as a result of the merger. 
We also extend in different directions the above results, initially derived in the basic 
framework. In particular, we introduce into the analysis product differentiation, price competition 
and the presence of (centralised) wage bargaining between the central union and an employers’ 
federation. More specifically, it is shown that the wage non-rigidity result is robust with respect to 
all the above-mentioned extensions of the basic framework. Furthermore, the higher the degree of 
product differentiation and the union’s relative bargaining power, the higher the probability that a 
merger is detrimental for profits. Finally, even if the same results are also obtained when firms 
compete in prices, the merger profitability reversal is less likely ceteris paribus to happen with 
respect to the case in which firms compete in quantities. 
The remaining part of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 a basic Cournot 
homogeneous duopoly model with an industry-wide monopoly union is developed. The equilibrium 
outcomes are derived for the pre-merger and post-merger cases and subsequently compared. In 
Section 3, the basic framework of the previous section is extended in various directions (product 
differentiation, price competition and wage bargaining). Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
 
2 Basic framework 
 
We consider a homogeneous product market where each firm sets its output – given pre-determined 
wages – to maximise profits (that is, competition is à la Cournot). The inverse market demand 
function is linear and given by: 
 
                                                
8 Brekke (2004) also obtains that the wage rigidity result does not apply when firms (hospitals) compete in 
quality under regulated prices. However, while in our case diminishing returns to labour play a crucial role, 
Brekke (2004) holds the constant returns standard assumption. Hence the mechanism behind his result is 
clearly different from ours. 
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(1) 
! 
p(Q) =  " #Q  
 
where 
! 
Q = qi + q j  is total output, with qi and qj denoting outputs by firm i and j (i, j = 1, 2 with i ≠ j), 
respectively, and α > 0. As usual, we consider that labour is the sole productive input. As already 
discussed in the Introduction, the previous literature on unionised oligopolies generally assumes 
constant returns to labour. However, also a decreasing returns to labour technology is rather realistic 
and thus in this paper we hypothesise that the two firms have access to the same technology which, 
for the representative firm i, is summarised by the following production function: 
 
(2) 
! 
qi = li  
 
with li representing the units of labour employed by firm i. The choice of the specific technology 
represented by (2) allows for the achievement of analytical results and amounts to saying that firms 
have quadratic costs, which is the typical example of convex costs in the literature (e.g. Perry and 
Porter 1985; Heywood and McGinty 2007). 
We consider a three-stage game with observable actions: at stage 1, the firms decide whether 
or not to merge; at stage 2, wages are set; finally, at stage 3, the firms choose output, hence 
employment. The game is solved by backwards induction. In this basic framework we assume that, 
at stage 2, a “monopolistic” industry-wide union fixes a uniform wage for this industry wi = wj = w. 
In particular, we consider that union utility takes the following Stone-Geary functional form (e.g. 
Dowrick and Spencer 1994): 
 
(3) 
! 
V = (w " w°)
#
L  
 
where L = l1 + l2 is overall employment in the industry, w < α is the union’s wage and w° ≥ 0 is the 
reservation wage, which may be assumed to be higher in industries with a higher fraction of skilled 
manpower (e.g. Pencavel 1985; Dowrick and Spencer 1994). Instead, θ  represents the weight 
placed by the union over wage with respect to employment. For instance, a value of θ = 1 refers to 
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the rent-maximising case.9 In order to preserve the economic meaningfulness of our results, in what 
follows we will assume that θ ∈ (0, 2).10 
 
2.1 Pre-merger (Cournot) case 
 
In the pre-merger game, at stage 3, firm i chooses quantity qi to maximise: 
 
(4) 
! 
" i = pqi # wqi
2. 
 
From (1) and (4), under profit-maximisation, firm i’s best-reply function is: 
 
(5) 
! 
qi (q j ) =  
" # q j
2(1+ w)
 
 
and, from (5) and its equivalent for firm j, we get firms’ output as a function of the wage w chosen 
by the union at the previous stage: 
 
(6) 
! 
qi(w) = q j (w) =
"
3+ 2w
. 
 
As regards wage setting at stage 2, after substitution of (6) in the union’s utility function 
(taking into account that li = qi 2) and maximising, we obtain the equilibrium wage chosen by the 
union: 
 
(7) 
! 
w
C
=
4w° + 3"
2(2 #")
 
 
where the superscript C recalls that it is obtained under Cournot competition in the product market 
(that is, it refers to the pre-merger case). Finally, by substituting for (7), we get pre-merger 
                                                
9 Remarkably, in this latter case the union maximisation problem is equivalent to that facing a profit-
maximising upstream monopoly that is allowed to set the price of an input it supplies to downstream firms. 
10 Notice that Pencavel (1985) argues for an empirical value of θ generally no higher than one. 
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equilibrium output and profit as, respectively: 
 
(8) 
! 
qi
C
= q j
C
= q
C
=
"(2 #$)
6 + 4w°
 
(9) 
! 
" i
C
= " j
C
= " C =
# 2(2 $%)(4 + 4w° + %)
8(3+ 2w°)
2
. 
 
2.2 Post-merger case 
 
In the post-merger game, the merged firm is a multi-plant monopoly that, at stage 3 of the game, 
sets outputs to maximise: 
 
(10) 
! 
" = # i + # j = (pqi $ wqi
2
) + (pq j $ wq j
2
)  
 
yielding the following outcomes in terms of overall quantity (as a function of the wage): 
 
(11) 
! 
Q(w) =
"
2 + w
.11 
 
In this case, taking (11) into account, the equilibrium wage chosen by the union at stage 2 is: 
 
(12) 
! 
w
M
=
2w° + 2"
2 #"
. 
 
Substituting for (12), we get the following post-merger equilibrium firm’s output and profit: 
 
(13) 
! 
Q
M
=
"(2 #$)
2(2 + w°)
 
                                                
11 Clearly, due to the firms’ symmetric position, we have qi(w) = qj(w) = Q(w)/2. Also notice that, due to the 
presence of decreasing returns to labour, it is always better for the merged entity to split the optimal output 
between the two existing plants instead of shutting down one, even if goods are perfect substitutes. 
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(14) 
! 
"
M
=
# 2(2 $%)
4(2 + w°)
. 
 
2.3 Non-rigid wages and merger profitability reversal 
 
In this subsection we first investigate whether and, if so, how the merger affects the equilibrium 
wage; in other words, whether a “wage rigidity result” (Dhillon and Petrakis 2002) still applies in 
this context with diminishing returns to labour. We then address the possibility of a “reversal result” 
in relation to the merger profitability. 
 
Proposition 1 [wage non-rigidity result]. The post-merger wage is always higher than when the 
firms are independent. Furthermore, the wage differential is increasing in θ. 
 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
 
The fact that the merger affects the wage set by a central union is rather novel from a 
theoretical viewpoint since the received result is that the labour price fixed by a central union is the 
same regardless of whether it faces one merged firm or two competing firms, which also implicitly 
means that the labour demand elasticity with respect to the wage does not change as a result of the 
merger.12 However, in our framework with decreasing returns to labour, the central union no longer 
charges the same wage independently of the degree of market competition. Indeed, the net effect of 
a merger on wage elasticity is to make employment less responsive to wage changes, enabling the 
union to increase wage claims.13 
Before turning to analyse merger profitability, we define the following preliminary outcome, 
which (together with Proposition 1) will be useful to understand the rationale behind the 
merger/profitability nexus in this context. 
                                                
12 From an empirical research perspective, instead, the wage effects of mergers are rather controversial. For 
instance, Cremieux and Van Audenrode (1996) and Peoples et al. (1993) found support for a wage cut 
following a merger, while McGuckin et al. (1995) obtained the opposite result. Hekmat (1995) found no 
evidence of any link between mergers and wages, while Gokhale et al. (1995) found no or only limited 
evidence of a link between takeovers and wages. 
13 In the working paper version (Fanti and Meccheri 2013), we provide further analyses and details. 
 9 
 
Lemma 1. Overall quantity produced by the merged firm is less than that produced when firms are 
independent. This also implies that price is higher in the post-merger case. Moreover, the 
(negative) output differential is decreasing in θ and w°. 
 
Proof. See Appendix B. 
 
According to Lemma 1, the ability to reduce output (and increase price) through a merger, 
so as to exploit market power, decreases when the union’s orientation towards wages and the 
workers’ reservation wage increase. Accordingly, we can state the following result in relation to 
merger profitability. 
 
Proposition 2 [merger profitability reversal]. A “reversal result” applies in relation to merger 
profitability (i.e. post-merger industry profits are lower than pre-merger industry profits) if and 
only if θ > 1/(2 + w°), that is, the central union is sufficiently interested in wages with respect to 
employment. Moreover, the higher the workers’ reservation wage, the higher the probability that 
the merger is detrimental for profits. 
 
Proof. See Appendix C. 
 
Given Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, stated above, Proposition 2 is rather intuitive. Indeed, θ 
positively affects the probability that a merger decreases profits by both increasing the wage 
differential and reducing the post/pre-merger output differential. In particular, when θ → 0, hence 
the central union tends to care only about employment, the reversal result never applies. This is 
because when θ → 0, w → w° (see (7) and (12)) and with an exogenous (reservation) wage the 
conventional result still applies even in the presence of convex labour costs. Moreover, notice that 
when θ = 1 the merger is always detrimental for profits (i.e. the “reversal result” always applies). 
This is particularly interesting since such a case relates to vertically related industries: in the 
presence of a profit-maximising upstream monopoly that provides a common input for downstream 
duopolists, merging is never profitable for the latter. The workers’ reservation wage, instead, does 
not affect the wage differential (since the unionised wage ultimately results in a mark-up on the 
reservation wage, the latter affects the pre-merger and the post-merger wage to the same extent), 
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while it reduces the output differential. Hence, the higher w°, the higher the probability that the 
“reversal result” applies.14 
 
3 Some extensions 
 
In order to assess the robustness of the previous results, in this section we extend the above-
analysed basic framework in various directions, namely product differentiation, price competition 
and wage bargaining. 
 
3.1 Product differentiation 
 
We consider now a differentiated product market where goods are assumed to be (imperfect) 
substitutes. Specifically, each firm i is faced with the following (inverse) demand function, which 
replaces (1) in the analysis (since we showed in the previous section that the market parameter α 
does not play any relevant role for our results, from here onwards we normalise it to one in order to 
simplify the analysis somewhat): 
 
(15) 
! 
pi(qi, q j ) =  1" qi " #q j   
 
                                                
14 Notice that if the monopoly union coordinates the wage demands, possibly setting different wages for each 
firm, its objective function would be 
! 
V = (wi "w°)
#
li + (w j "w°)
#
l j . Nevertheless, as long as firms are 
symmetric, our results still apply. This is because firm symmetry means that, in equilibrium, the union’s 
choice collapses to a single wage, which is the same irrespective of the monopoly union’s strategy in setting 
wages (e.g. Haucup and Wey 2004). Clearly, admitting for some form of asymmetries between firms would 
make the results more heterogeneous (the analysis of an “asymmetric” context lies beyond the scope of this 
work and is left for future research). Moreover, as correctly remarked by an anonymous referee, the analysis 
would be more elaborate by introducing wage bargaining between the union and each single firm, due to the 
role played by the union’s disagreement payoff (whose proper specification, as discussed in Horn and 
Wolinsky 1988 and Davidson 1988, is not an obvious matter). For the reason explained in Section 3.3, when 
we extend the basic framework with monopoly union to wage bargaining, we refer instead to a centralised 
context where the union bargains vis-à-vis a single employers’ federation maximising the firms’ joint profit. 
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where γ ∈ (0,1) is a measure of substitutability in demand between products. In particular, if γ → 0 
the brands are regarded as unrelated, whereas γ → 1 corresponds to the case, studied above, of 
homogeneous goods. In this context, undertaking the analysis of the previous section, we get the 
following equilibrium outcomes: 
 
(16) 
! 
w
PD
C
=
4w° + "(2 + #)
2(2 $")
;  
! 
qPD
C =
2 "#
2 2(1+ w°) + $)[ ]
;  
! 
"
PD
C =
(2 #$) 4(1+ w°) + $%[ ]
8 2(1+ w°) + %[ ]
2
 
(17) 
! 
w
PD
M
=
2w° + "(1+ #)
2 $"
;  
! 
Q
PD
M
=
2 "#
2(1+ w° + $)
;  
! 
"
PD
M
=
2 #$
4(1+ w° + %)
 
 
where the subscript PD refers to the product differentiation case. 
As shown in Appendix D, from (16) and (17), the following results highlighting the role of 
the degree of product differentiation/substitutability can be stated: 
 
• the post-merger wage is always higher than when the firms are independent. Furthermore, 
the wage differential is increasing in γ; 
• overall quantity produced by the merged firm is less than that produced when firms are 
independent and the (negative) output differential is increasing in γ; 
• a “reversal result” applies in relation to the merger profitability if and only if 
! 
" > # /(1+ w° + #) . Hence, the higher the degree of product differentiation (i.e. the lower is γ), 
the higher the probability that merger is detrimental for profits. 
 
The above findings qualitatively confirm the non-rigidity wage result and the merger 
profitability reversal as obtained in the basic framework with homogeneous goods. Most 
importantly, they point out the role played by the degree of product differentiation. In particular, the 
role of γ in affecting the possibility of a “reversal result” concerning merger profitability is twofold. 
On the one hand, when γ increases the (negative) output differential increases too, permitting the 
merged firm to largely exploit market power. This makes sense. When γ → 0, independent firms 
operate as monopolists in different markets and there is no room to further increase market power 
through a merger. By contrast, competition between independent firms is fiercer when products are 
higher substitutes (i.e. for higher γ values) and, in such a case, merging can actually permit greater 
 12 
market power to be exploited, resulting in lower output levels. On the other hand, however, also the 
wage differential increases with γ, reducing merger profitability. Nevertheless, the former (positive) 
effect always outweighs the latter (negative) effect, implying that the probability that a merger is 
actually detrimental for profits decreases ceteris paribus with γ. 
 
3.2 Price competition 
 
Now we consider a model of differentiated duopoly where firms compete in prices, i.e. a Bertrand 
model. From (15) and its counterpart for firm j, we can write firm i’s product demand as: 
 
(18) 
! 
qi(pi, p j ) =
1" pi " #(1" p j )
1" # 2
. 
 
While equilibrium outcomes regarding the post-merger (monopoly) case are obviously the 
same as in the quantity setting case (see (17)), in this section we derive equilibrium results for the 
pre-merger (Bertrand) case. By using (4) and (18), profit-maximisation leads to the choice of the 
price by firm i as a function of the price chosen by firm j as: 
 
(19) 
! 
pi(p j ) =
1+ 2w " # 2( ) 1" #(1" p j )[ ]
2 1+ w " # 2( )
 
 
from which, taking the corresponding expression of firm j into account, we get the Bertrand 
equilibrium prices for a given wage rate: 
 
(20) 
! 
pi(w) =
1+ 2w " # 2
2(1+ w) + #(1" #)
. 
 
Hence, by substituting in (18) we obtain output as a function of the wage rate: 
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(21) 
! 
qi(w) =
1
2(1+ w) + "(1# ")
.15 
 
At stage 2, after substitution of (21) in the union utility function and maximising, we obtain 
the equilibrium wage chosen by the union: 
 
(22) 
! 
w
B =
4w° + " 2 + #(1$ #)[ ]
2(2 $")
 
 
where the superscript B recalls that it is obtained under Bertrand competition in the product market. 
Finally, by substituting back, we get the equilibrium output and profits for this case: 
 
(23) 
! 
q
B =
2 "#
2 2(1+ w°) + $(1" $)[ ]
;  
! 
" B =
(2 #$) 4 1+ w° + % 2( ) + $%(1+ %)[ ]
8 2(1+ w°) + %(1# %)[ ]
2
. 
 
In Appendix E, by using the results of this section, we show that our previous findings 
regarding the non-rigidity wage result and the merger profitability reversal hold true also when 
firms compete in prices. In particular, a “reversal result” applies in relation to the merger 
profitability if and only if 
! 
" > #(1+ #) /(1+ w° + #). By comparing such a critical value for θ against 
that obtained under Cournot competition (
! 
" /(1+ w° + ") ), it is also possible to infer that (ceteris 
paribus) the reversal result is more likely when firms compete à la Cournot instead of à la Bertrand. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 By passing, notice that for γ = 1 (homogeneous goods) Dastidar (1995) proves that with identical, 
continuous and convex cost functions, price competition typically leads to multiple pure strategy Nash 
equilibria, with the standard profit-maximising price belonging to the range of equilibrium prices (see André 
et al. 2009, for an application). Although we refer to a framework with differentiated goods, also note that 
for the limit case with γ → 1, the equilibrium result of the product market stage tends to the Bertrand 
reference case in which price is equal to marginal cost. 
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3.3 Wage bargaining 
 
In this section we introduce wage bargaining into the analysis. In particular, we adopt a Right-to-
Manage model, in which, at stage two, the wage is negotiated between parties while, at stage three, 
the downstream agents choose final output or price (hence, employment). Moreover, since we are 
interested in assessing the robustness in this framework of the “wage rigidity result”, we consider a 
situation in which wage negotiation is centralised at the industry level. Thus the central union 
bargains vis-à-vis an employers’ federation which maximises overall profits (Dhillon and Petrakis 
2002).16 Accordingly, the general asymmetric Nash bargain over wage between union-employers 
federation solves: 
 
(24) 
! 
w = argmax " =V #$1%#{ }  
 
where β is the union’s relative bargaining power parameter (
! 
" # (0,1) ). Furthermore, since the role 
played by the reservation wage, the union’s preference towards wages and the degree of product 
differentiation have been already elucidated above, we are now interested in specifically assessing 
the role of bargaining power distribution. Hence we fix w° = 0, θ = 1 (i.e. total wage bill 
maximising union) and γ = 1. This allows us to simplify the analysis, permitting its algebraic 
tractability. 
                                                
16 The issue of what unions and firms bargain over is a subject that has been widely discussed. It has often 
been claimed that trade unions do not bargain directly over employment, and that employment setting lies 
firmly in the hands of firms. As pointed out, e.g., by Machin et al. (1993, p. 169), this stylised fact (which is 
in favour of the Right-to-Manage model against Efficient Bargaining) “receives support from a number of 
sources, including the content of actual contracts and consideration of institutional arrangements under 
which wage and employment setting occur”. Moreover, also notice that, since we refer to a situation where 
bargaining involves a centralised union vis-à-vis a firms’ federation which cares of the joint profits, if parties 
bargain simultaneously on wage and employment (i.e. Efficient Bargaining), the bargaining outcomes would 
be trivially the same in the pre and post-merger cases (clearly, this is not true in a Right-to-Manage 
framework due to the fact that employment is individually chosen by the firm(s) at the final stage). In other 
words, under Efficient Bargaining, the possibility of the occurrence of a “wage non-rigidity result” would be 
a priori prevented. 
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Considering competition à la Cournot, by substituting the proper values from Section 2.1 in 
(24), maximising and solving with respect to w, we get: 
 
(25) 
! 
w
BAR
C
=
1+ 2" + 4" 2 + 20" +1
4
 
 
where the subscript BAR recalls that it is obtained under wage bargaining. By substituting (25) in (6) 
and (4), we get the firm’s equilibrium profit for this case: 
 
(26) 
! 
"
BAR
C =
3+ 2# + 4# 2 + 20# +1
5 + 2# + 4# 2 + 20# +1( )
2
. 
 
Instead, in the post-merger game, by substituting from Section 2.2 in (24), maximising and 
solving with respect to w, we get: 
 
(27) 
! 
w
BAR
M
= 2"  
 
and, by substituting back, the following equilibrium profit: 
 
(28) 
! 
"
BAR
M
=
1
4(1+ #)
. 
 
Accordingly, in Appendix F we show that the post-merger wage is higher provided that the 
union’s bargaining power is sufficiently high (i.e. β > 0.25). Moreover, this also implies that a 
“reversal result” on merger profitability actually applies when the union is relatively stronger 
than the employers’ federation (i.e. β > 0.5). 
By means of numerical analysis, Table 1 reports the threshold value for θ above which the 
“reversal result” on merger profitability applies, for different parameter combinations including 
β. In line with the above results, the merger profitability reversal is ceteris paribus more likely 
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to occur (i.e. the threshold for θ is lower), the higher w° and β, and the lower γ.17 
 
Table 1. “Profitability reversal” under Cournot competition: θ  thresholds for different parameters18 
w° = 0.25 
β  = 
 
0.25 0.5 0.75 
0.25 0.9756 0.3634 0.2239 
0.5 1.5668 0.6064 0.3796 γ  = 
0.75 1.9436 0.7778 0.4937 
 w° = 0.5 
β  = 
 
0.25 0.5 0.75 
0.25 0.8457 0.3131 0.1923 
0.5 1.4000 0.5352 0.3333 γ  = 
0.75 1.7748 0.6991 0.4408 
 w° = 0.75 
β  = 
 
0.25 0.5 0.75 
0.25 0.7460 0.2749 0.1685 
0.5 1.2639 0.4788 0.2971 γ  = 
0.75 1.6309 0.6345 0.3980 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
Can a merger from duopoly to monopoly be detrimental for profits? This paper dealt with this issue 
by focusing on the interaction between decreasing returns to labour (which imply firms’ convex 
costs) and centralised unionisation. A particular focus was whether a merger from duopoly to 
                                                
17 In the working paper version (Fanti and Meccheri 2013) we show that, under wage bargaining, the same 
qualitative results hold true when firms compete in prices instead of in quantities. Furthermore, it is also 
confirmed in this more general framework that (ceteris paribus) the reversal result is always more likely 
when (independent) firms compete à la Cournot instead of à la Bertrand. 
18 For different combinations of the other parameters, each cell shows the θ value, above which the merger 
profitability reversal applies. For instance, for w° = β = γ = 0.25, merger reduces profitability for θ > 0.9756. 
All the results are derived in MAPLE (programs available from the authors upon request). 
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monopoly in the downstream market may influence centralised wage setting and how, in turn, this 
affects the profitability of the merger. In doing so, our work challenged the common wisdom, 
suggesting that centralised wage setting is unaffected by the number of competing firms in the 
(downstream) product market and, as a consequence, the standard result that the merger is profitable 
can never be reversed. 
We showed that, in the presence of decreasing returns to labour, centralised wage setting is 
actually affected by the structure of the downstream market. In other words, the standard “wage 
rigidity result” of centralised wage setting no longer applies. Specifically, the post-merger wage is 
higher than before the merger, hence reducing its profitability. In particular, a “reversal result” in 
relation to merger profitability can occur when the union’s preference towards wages is sufficiently 
high. Moreover, the higher the reservation wage, the degree of product differentiation and the 
union’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the employers’ federation, the higher the probability that profits 
decrease as a result of the merger. 
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